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 As will be seen, an important point in the argument to 
follow is that, as Simone Weil said, “If a child is doing a 
sum and does it wrong, the mistake bears the stamp of his 
personality. If he does the sum exactly right, his 
personality does not enter into it at all”. This is the 
reason why academic activity is an essentially communitarian 
practice, though its present material conditions force 
academics and academic managers meticulously to insist on 
crediting everything that is done to one or more individuals 
(which in turn provides an incentive for cheating, as we have 
seen recently). Though this article appears under my name, 
its central ideas have been developed in conversation with 
Juan Pablo Mañalich and Samuel Tschorne. If Simone Weil is 
right, my authorship (my “personality”) appears where I 
misunderstood them or fail to express them correctly. I am 
also most grateful to Francisco Saffie’s comments, whose 
attempt to look at taxes as sacraments is highly promising. I 
am also in debt with Juan Ignacio Wilson, without whose 
assistance this English version would have been impossible.  
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All true good carries with it 
conditions which are contradictory and 
as a consequence is impossible. He who 
keeps his attention really fixed on 
this impossibility and acts will do 
what is good. 
Simone Weil, Gravity and Grace (1949) 
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 We live under the domain of dead ideas. To a considerable 
extent, our political language seems to be meaningless. What 
is the meaning of, for example, “Sovereignty rests 
essentially with the Nation, and it is exercised by the 
people1”? How can we say, without naïvety, that law is the 
will of the people, and that the people is the bearer of 
constituent power? When and how (if at all) can we say that a 
constitution imposed by a dictator or an occupying power is 
the people’s? This is what I would like to discuss in this 
paper: not the answers to these questions, but how to make 
them intelligible. 
I. LIVING UNDER DEAD IDEAS 
But when the social bond begins to 
fail and the State is weakened, when 
private interests begin to make 
themselves felt and small factions to 
exercise influence on the State, the 
common interest is harmed and [...]the 
general will is no longer the will of 
all. 
J J Rousseau, The Social contract 
(1762) 
The riddle of every constitution: 
the ascription of the rules of ascription 
Maybe the last question, given its obvious political 
relevance in Chile, is a good start. Can the people 
appropriate a Constitution which was originally imposed? Or 
must we say, on the contrary, that the initial heteronomy is 
insurmountable? Can an originally heteronomous Constitution 
                     
1 Article 5 of the Chilean Constitution. All references to 
articles hereafter must be understood as references to the 
Chilean constitutional text, unless stated otherwise. 
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become autonomous? If the Constitution was imposed by a 
dictatorship, as the decreto ley 3464 was in Chile (and I 
have no intention to join the collective amnesia that 
apparently affects our constitutional theory on this matter), 
would not “appropriating” it be but a way of falling in love 
with our chains? 
The starting point must be our initial observation: it 
seems as though these questions are difficult because their 
answer is problematic (one can imagine the “realist” asking: 
“barring political rhetoric, how does the people go around 
becoming the owner of an alien constitution?”), while in 
truth the hard part is to understand it. We shall see that 
understanding and developing the question is to find an 
answer. Thus, our first stop must be to consider why it is 
difficult to understand. For now, we can say bluntly: 
appropriating the constitution is an action, and in that 
action we are supposed to read a volition. Hence if the 
people is the bearer of constituent power it must be able to 
act and to have a will. But what, strictly speaking, is for 
the people to act, to have a will?  
The answer seems to be simple: law is the will of the 
people, and the institutional forms thorough which law is 
produced is the manner in which the people act, the way in 
which its will can be formed. Thus, according to article 5, 
Sovereignty rests essentially with the Nation. It is 
exercised by the people through the plebiscites and periodic 
elections, as well as by the authorities established by this 
Constitution. No sector of the people nor any individual may 
assume its exercise. 
Thus the people acts trough institutional forms, and those 
forms identify what is to count as the will of the people.  
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There is nothing unusual in this. In fact, law can 
trivially ascribe a will to entities that, strictly speaking, 
seem incapable of wanting anything. Thus the opinion of one 
or more human beings counts as the will of a corporation when 
the former has been formed in the appropriate way. This 
appropriate way takes the form of a procedure, so that any 
decision that has been taken by following such procedure is 
recognized as a decision taken by the corporation. The 
procedure is specified by law or by the articles of 
association. Whatever its source, these are what we could 
call “secondary rules of ascription”. To say that a 
corporation wills something is to apply to some facts a given 
rule of ascription. Such a statement looks like a 
description, but in truth is what Raz called an “applied 
legal statement”2 (i.e. a statement the truth of which 
depends upon the validity of certain rules and the occurrence 
of certain facts).  
Thus from a legal point of view there is a readily 
available answer to the question of how can the people will 
something. The people wills whatever corresponds to the 
occurrence of certain facts in the world, as specified by 
certain constitutional rules of ascription. In the Chilean 
case, such rules are contained in articles 5, 6 & 7. When a 
bill is submitted to either chamber of Congress, it reflects 
only the will of the individual member of parliament or 
political party who presented it. That is to say, it is the 
will not of the people but of a faction. But when the bill is 
duly voted and approved, and later enacted by the President, 
                     
2 Raz, The Concept of a Legal System, p. 217 
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it becomes the will of the people. It becomes the will of the 
people because it has been so enacted. 
But this is too simple an answer, because what ought to 
be ascribed to the people is not only the rules formed 
through the procedure set by secondary rules of ascription, 
but these rules themselves. Here our analogy collapses: 
precisely because in the case of a corporation the rules of 
ascription (at least some of them) are previous to the 
existence of the corporation (and independent from it) it is 
possible for the corporation to form a will. Without these 
secondary rules of ascription the corporation would not, 
could not possibly have a will. And these rules are there 
before the corporation ever was. They are not valid because 
the corporation wants them. On the contrary: the corporation 
is able to want something because of the validity of these 
rules. But if the constitution contains the rules of 
ascription of a will to the people, how can we ascribe the 
constitution to the people, that is to say, how can the 
people will its own rules of ascription? 
This is the paradox of the constitution, the “riddle of 
all constitutions” the answer to which is democracy. 
The people as institutional fact 
But how can democracy be the solution to the riddle of all 
constitutions if democracy itself presupposes a constitution? 
In fact, democracy is the idea that “state power must be 
articulated in such a way that both its organization and its 
exercise derive from the will of the people or can be 
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ascribed to it.”3 The fact that the rules of ascription are 
part of what must be ascribed to the people suggests that the 
people has two modes of action, that there are, we may say, 
two concepts of ‘the people’: one institutional and one pre-
institutional. Institutionally speaking, ‘the people’ is that 
which acts through the operation of the norms of ascription 
as already mentioned; pre-institutionally speaking, ‘the 
people’ is that which wills those rules of ascription. 
Let us go back to article 5: 
Sovereignty rests essentially with the Nation. It is 
exercised by the people through the plebiscites and periodic 
elections, as well as by the authorities established by this 
Constitution. No sector of the people, nor any individual may 
assume its exercise. 
There are three rules here. According to the first, 
sovereignty rests essentially with the nation; according to 
the second, it is exercised by the people, but only through 
institutional forms (plebiscites, periodic elections and 
constitutionally established authorities); the third rule, 
finally, forbids any faction not authorised by a rule of 
ascription to act as agents for the people. This last rule is 
complemented by article 7 (second paragraph) of the same 
text: 
No magistrature, no person or group of persons may assume, 
even on the pretext of extraordinary circumstances, any 
authority or rights other than those expressly conferred upon 
them by this Constitution or by law. 
This seems, again, paradoxical: the constitution is willed by 
the people, but the people can only act in ways specified by 
the constitution or according to it. The former idea makes 
                     
3 Böckenförde, "La democracia como principio constitucional", 
p. 47. 
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the constitution seem autonomous, the latter heteronomous. 
But, how can the same norm, related to the same agent, be at 
once autonomous and heteronomous? 
There is a sense in which this is indeed paradoxical, 
but before we discuss it we have to notice that in these two 
apparently contradictory features (autonomy/heteronomy) 
resides nothing less than the explanation of the very meaning 
of law. Every legal concept is the formalization of a pre-
legal concept.4 The function of the legal concept is to make 
probable the pre-legal concept, which would be impossible or 
at least improbable without it. This is as valid for concepts 
such as “contract” and “testament” as it is for concepts like 
“law” and “constitution”. Thus, for example, cooperation is, 
without law, improbable. What is probable is that each 
individual will act towards the other in an objectifying 
manner, i.e., will try to force or manipulate the other into 
doing what the first one wants. In other words, each will 
understand the other as an instance of a much larger problem: 
that the world shows resistance to their will. The world’s 
resistance has to be trumped somehow, and in this all that 
succeeds is success: 
if any two men desire the same thing, which nevertheless they 
cannot both enjoy, they become enemies; and in the way to 
their end (which is principally their own conservation, and 
                     
4 This is what distinguishes institutions like law from 
institutions like games. That is why the analogy between 
legal rules and the rules of games, although useful in a 
certain sense, may confuse rather than clarify the analysis 
of law as an institutional system. This is thoroughly 
discussed in chapter 1 of Atria, Law and Legal Reasoning, 
where “regulatory” institutions (like law) are distinguished 
from “autonomous” institutions (like games)  
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sometimes their delectation only) endeavour to destroy or 
subdue one another.5 
Because (if) there is law, the way to their end does not lead 
to destroying or subduing the nother. Without law (in Hobbes’ 
“natural condition of mankind”), there is no reason why I 
should refrain from using force or manipulation to obtain 
what I want, which is to say that the world is for me an 
instrument for my ends. The relation between self and the 
other will be purely instrumental, because the other does not 
appear before him or her as an other, but as part of a world 
that has to be manipulated to achieve his or her ends. The 
law of contracts makes my forcing or manipulating the other 
self-defeating: my using force or deceit to obtain your 
consent to a contract (to “destroy or subdue” you) will be 
detrimental to me or, at least, useless (not only I will be 
punished because of the illegal aggression, but I will also 
find out, when I want to enforce the contract, that my fraud 
or duress makes it void). Thus if I want something you have, 
trying to get it by destroying or subduing you will not be in 
my interest; I will have to contract with you, and in order 
for that contract to be valid I will have to treat you as if 
I recognise you as an equal (without fraud, duress, etc). By 
making my objectifying action self-defeating law makes 
probable that I relate to you as if I recognized that you are 
not just another parcel of the world that I can use to pursue 
my own ends, but an end in itself. It makes probable, in 
other words, that I relate to you as if I recognized you as 
an ‘other’. 
                     
5 Hobbes, Leviathan, ch. 13. 
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Very much the same can be said of other (indeed: all) 
formal concepts. Take “testament.” The function of a 
testament is to make trivially ascertainable something that 
without it would be hard to identify, the deceased’s last 
will as to how his or her assets ought to be distributed. But 
the law does not accord the institutional status of 
“testament” to any plan as to how my assets will be 
distributed after my death. It has to meet some requirements: 
the testator must be sane of mind, it must be given in the 
presence of a number of witness, or in writing, etc. These 
conditions are such that, if they are met, it is probable 
that the will expressed in it will actually be the last will 
of the decedent. 
Both pairs (exchange between equals/contract, last will 
of the decedent/testament) show the relation between the pre-
institutional (“brute”) concept and its institutional 
correlate. They also show that the function of the 
institutional concept can only be achieved if it is opaque to 
its institutional correlate, i.e. insofar as in its operation 
the institutional concept becomes autonomous from the pre-
institutional concept: the claim that an unfair contract is 
immediately void and is not (because of its unfairness) 
legally binding is incompatible with the existence of the law 
of contracts, just as it is incompatible with the existence 
of a testament that it may be struck down proving by any 
means that the decedent’s last will was somehow (anyhow) 
different. 
Thus the three rules contained in article 5 reflect the 
structure common to every legal concept: the pre-legal 
concept (the first rule) is formalized (second) and then the 
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formal concept becomes, in its operation, opaque to its pre-
institutional correlate (third). 
This is indeed part of the explanation, but it does not 
do away with the problem altogether. As was said above, there 
is something paradoxical in article 5. But to identify the 
paradox it is not enough to distinguish a pre-institutional 
and an institutional concept of the people, so that the 
second is opaque to the first and in particular cases might 
even appear to be in opposition. This, for the reasons 
explained above, is common to every legal concept. In order 
to see the problem we have to notice that legal concepts are 
opaque in relation to their pre-legal correlatives, not in 
their intelligibility but in their operation: although 
‘contract’ and ‘testament’ are opaque in their operation to 
‘fair exchange’ and ‘last will of the deceased,’ they are 
dependent on them (or, of course, any alternative 
possibility) as regards their intelligibility: understanding 
its relation to the notion of ‘fair exchange’ is necessary in 
order to understand the concept of ‘contract’, and in order 
to understand the concept of ‘testament’ we have to refer it 
to the concept of ‘deceased’s last will.’ If these pre-
institutional concepts were unintelligible, then the 
corresponding legal concepts would be equally unintelligible, 
just an empty formalism. And the problem is that the very 
concept of ‘the people’ in a pre-institutional sense seems 
unintelligible. As Bruce Ackerman has said, in a passage we 
shall discuss later on,  
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we all know what it is for an individual to decide something, 
but what is it for a collectivity so grand as the People to 
enter constitutional politics in a meaningful way?6 
But if the pre-institutional concept of ‘the people’ is 
unintelligible, the institutional concept of ‘the people’ is 
a mere formalism, a mystification contrived to deceive us, to 
make us believe we live according to our own will when we are 
actually subjected to an alien will. A dead idea. 
A pre-institutional concept of ‘the people’ 
If we are to say that the will of the people is whatever can 
be institutionally ascribed to the people, we must be 
capable, at least in principle, to identify what can it 
possibly mean for the people to want something, to have a 
will, in a pre-institutional sense. Here it seems we must 
choose one of the following answers: 
The first answer is that ‘the people’ is a physical 
entity, characterized by some pre-political feature (“pre-
political” here does not mean “metaphysical”, but only “not 
politically constituted”): by race, religion, language, etc. 
This is the sense in which the expression is used when we 
speak of ‘native (or indigenous) peoples’. Here ‘people’ is 
an entity characterized by some natural feature, which 
defines an identity: “the self-identity of the concretely 
present people as a political unity.”7 
The second answer is the one usually given by 
economists: “the people” is the name we use to refer to the 
aggregation of individuals, and its will is the will that 
results from adding all the particular wills. In this sense 
                     
6 Ackerman, "The political case for constitutional courts", 
p. 209. 
7 Schmitt, Constitutional Theory, p. 255. 
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we cannot speak about “the people” (el pueblo), but just 
about “people” (personas). 
The most salient aspect of these two explanations about 
what ‘the people’ is and what its “will” consists of is that 
they are both incapable of making intelligible the democratic 
rules of ascription, insofar as democracy relies on 
institutions; in fact, for both institutions imply a form of 
mediation the function of which cannot be, strictly speaking, 
making the identification of the people’s will more probable, 
but rather less. For the first, the identity between rulers 
and ruled is what is crucial, and this identity is hindered 
or denied by the institutions we recognize as democratic. 
Thus, in this sense, the people’s form of expression par 
excellence is acclamation: 
Only the genuinely assembled people can do that which 
pertains distinctly to the activity of this people. They can 
acclaim in that they express their consent or disapproval by 
a simple calling out, calling higher or lower, celebrating a 
leader or a suggestion, honoring the king or some other 
person, or denying the acclamation by silence or 
complaining.8 
Democratic political forms aim at “directly ignoring the 
assembled people as such”, because  
a distinctive feature of the bourgeois Rechtsstaat 
constitution is to ignore the sovereign, whether this 
sovereign is the monarch or the people.9 
This renders problematic the democratic forms of popular 
participation:  
The election or vote, more precisely, is a secret individual 
vote. The method of the secret individual vote, however, is 
not democratic. It is, rather, an expression of liberal 
individualism ... . In the struggle against impermissible 
                     
8 ibid, 272. 
9 ibid, 273. 
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electoral influencing by the government and against other 
misuses, the demand for secret individual ballots makes sense 
and is relatively justified. Nevertheless, it is necessary to 
understand its nature correctly and to be clear that in 
principle it is part of the circle of ideas associated with 
liberal individualism and contradicts the political principle 
of democracy. For the logically consistent execution of the 
secret individual election and the individual vote transforms 
the distinctly democratic, or political, figure, the state 
citizen or citoyen, into a private man who, from the sphere 
of the private, whether or not this private sphere may be his 
religion or his economic interest or both together, expresses 
a private opinion and casts his vote. Secret individual 
ballot means that the voting state citizen is isolated in the 
decisive moment.10 
With remarkable anticipation, Schmitt discusses what today 
appears as a manifestation of the so-called e-democracy: 
It is fully conceivable that one day through ingenious 
discoveries every single person, without leaving his 
apartment, could continuously express his opinions on 
political questions through an apparatus and that all these 
opinions would automatically be registered by a central 
office, where one would only need to read them off. That 
would not be an especially intensive democracy, but it would 
provide a proof of the fact that the state and the public 
were fully privatized. The result is only a sum of private 
opinions. In this way, no common will arises, no volonté 
générale, only the sum of all individual will, a volanté de 
tous, does.11 
To Schmitt, therefore, the characteristic institutions of 
representative democracy do not have the function of making 
the identification of the people’s will probable, but, on the 
contrary, neutralizing the people, making it politically 
irrelevant.12 Thus, the idea of the people as a political 
                     
10 ibid. 
11 ibid, 274. 
12 This is the same thesis defended by Left-wing 
intellectuals who advocate a “participatory democracy” as 
opposed to a “representative democracy”. In relation to this, 
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concept is at least in tension and, strictly speaking, is in 
contradiction with democratic institutions, insofar as the 
first implies that the main function of these institutions is 
to neutralize it. Constitutional principles like article 5 
are empty declarations with no real political content. The 
only reason why we would not say, on this reading, that they 
are dead ideas is that they were never truly alive. 
This may be predictable, because after all Schmitt has 
gone down in history as Nazism’s legal scholar. If one wishes 
to find an explanation of the political meaning of ‘the 
people’ that is compatible with democratic institutions, the 
plausible thing to do is to look for it in the work of those 
who have defended democratic institutional forms, not in the 
work of those who have attacked them. 
Bruce Ackerman, for example, criticizes Schmitt 
precisely because his comprehension of the idea of ‘the 
people’ is totalitarian. In fact, to return to a passage 
already partially quoted, 
The crucial problem is the People with a capital P. We all 
know what it is for an individual to decide something, but 
what is it for a collectivity so grand as the People to enter 
constitutional politics in a meaningful way.13 
Ackerman makes reference to the very same passages of 
Schmitt’s Verfassungslehre we have quoted, in particular to 
his statement that the people’s mean of expression par 
excellence is acclamation and continues: 
Once Schmitt ‘solves’ the problema of identification  in this 
brutalized way, his Nazism follows immediately: the rallies 
at Nuremberg are just the kind of remedy for the disease of 
                                                               
vid. Moulian, Socialismo del Siglo XXI, p. 121, y Atria, 
"Veinte años después, neoliberalismo con rostro humano". 
13 Ackerman, "The political case for constitutional courts", 
p. 209. 
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modernity that Schmitt is prescribing in his 
Verfassungslehre.14 
Notice the way in which Ackerman claims to have found the 
connection between these two ideas: from an existential 
understanding of ‘the people’ Nazism is immediately derived. 
That is the reason why, as Schmitt says, the liberal wants to 
neutralize ‘the people’: the point of the institutions of 
representative democracy is to make politically irrelevant 
this existential reality, prior to institutions, which can 
acclaim. The liberal sees no political sense whatsoever in 
this notion of ‘the people’, so he replaces it with the 
second sense, which is based on what “everyone knows”, 
namely, what it means for an individual to want something, 
added: that which is politically relevant is the sum of the 
preferences of the individuals that live in a specific 
territory. But then democratic institutions can only be seen 
as a pale second-best vis-à-vis the idea of direct democracy, 
in which each one can defend his own interest by him- or 
herself, with no intermediaries. In fact, Ackerman believes 
that ‘the people’ expresses in rare occasions which he calls 
“constitutional moments”. These constitutional moments are 
characterized precisely by the divesting of institutional 
bonds, because during them the people expresses by means of 
what Ackerman once called, apparently without noting the 
contradiction, “extraordinary institutional forms.”15 
Since democracy is about aggregating what we all know, 
namely, what it is for an individual to decide something, in 
the most efficient way possible, in order to answer a much 
                     
14 ibid. 
15 Ackerman, "The Storr Lectures: Discovering the 
Constitution", p. 1022. 
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less obvious question (“what is it for a collectivity so 
grand as the People to enter constitutional politics in a 
meaningful way?”), the liberal agrees with Schmitt on just 
this point: the institutional forms that mediate, i.e., that 
stand between individuals and their preferences or 
convictions and the decisions that are accorded the 
institutional status of “the people’s”, are problematic. And 
they are problematic because they mediate, because they 
perennially face the ‘cut-out-the-middleman’ objection. Their 
being problematic does not mean of course that they are 
unjustified (this is what Schmitt called a “relative” 
justification, like that of the individual secret vote by 
reference to “the struggle against impermissible electoral 
influencing by the government and against other misuses”). 
What this means is that they are forced upon us by the 
transition from ideas to really existing institutions. If 
this is so, the fact that it has become empirically possible 
to do away with them immediately challenges them. Hence e-
democracy. 
What is striking is that both Schmitt and Ackerman agree 
on this: Schmitt believes that popular acclaim is “more 
democratic” than the result of an institutional process, 
because it is immediate; Ackerman believes that the people 
expressing through extra-institutional means (in 
“constitutional moments”) is a form of democracy superior to 
the institutional expression (“normal”) of the people, 
because it is a form not mediated by institutions. The 
parallelism is too precise for it not to be meaningful. 
In fact, in the broader public debate (I am leaving 
behind Schmitt and Ackerman now) the parallelism continues, 
and it is expressed in the proposals for institutional reform 
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that nowadays have become common to both the left and right. 
Insofar as mediating institutions are seen as hindering the 
people’s expression, these fashionable proposals purport to 
diminish their mediating capacity, making them more 
transparent to what individuals “really” (i.e., without 
mediation, immediately) want. Direct democracy is, for both, 
the ideal situation: for some because in this way the people 
may act directly and immediately, acclaiming in assembly (or 
protesting on the streets);  for others because the more 
direct democracy is, the closer the decision will be to the 
preferences to be added (the less mediated the decision is, 
the more precise the addition will be). And of course, 
actually existing representative democracy and political 
parties defined by an ideology, and any association of 
citizens other than single-issue movements are poor 
substitutes for direct democracy, for the immediate 
expression of the citizens’ will through, for example, some 
form of e-democracy which was not technologically feasible in 
the past. 
In my opinion this is our current predicament, 
especially after we look at what has occurred in some Latin-
American countries: while direct appeal to the people is 
disqualified as a “plebiscitary” or “populist” form of 
democracy, our institutions suffer from an acute legitimation 
crisis, which (it is suggested) may be mitigated by reforms 
meant to make political decision-making more immediate: 
popular initiative, decisions by referenda, recalling, 
attention to the dominant preferences expressed in opinion 
polls, primary elections for selecting candidates, etc. The 
malaise of democratic institutions is manifested in sharp 
skepticism towards them: can we seriously say that in any 
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real sense law is really the will of the people? The law 
might be will, but in that case it will anybody’s but the 
people’s: maybe the will of economic groups, or of the 
“political class”, of those who practice influence peddling, 
etc. (and that explains, by way of compensation, why it has 
become common to understand law in a way which devaluates the 
role of legislation and understands it –the law– as reason 
rather than will: a regression, in other words, to pre-modern 
forms of law, sometimes called neo-constitutionalism).
 II. SIGNIFYING IMPERFECTLY 
Il y a un autre monde, mais il est 
dans celui-ci. 
Paul Eluard 
Regarding Schmitt, Ackerman shows no disposition to engage, 
to be questioned by him. Schmitt can be simply excluded from 
the conversation by mocking him, because as a Nazi jurist he 
has become fair ground. And that is so notwithstanding the 
fact that Ackerman perceives the key to solve our riddle. 
Since he seems not interested in understanding Schmitt, 
however, he misses it. The point is that, as Ackerman 
notices, Schmitt’s Theory of the Constitution 
Is a piece of ‘negative theology’, with the crucial exception 
that Schmitt’s god-term is the Volk: he tells us a lot about 
how the will of the Volk should not be confused with normal 
acts of political representation, but he is very weak in 
developing affirmative criteria for identifying the magical 
event.16 
Ackerman’s point here is not to understand, but to discredit 
(“not only he was a Nazi, but also believed in magical 
nonsense”, one could say). Saying that something is 
“theological,” in this context, is equal to say that it is 
“magical,” i.e., irrational (like believing in witches or 
unicorns). The point has been correctly identified by Jeremy 
Waldron: 
Secular theorists often assume that they know what a 
religious argument is like: they present it as a crude 
prescription from God, backed up with threat of hellfire, 
derived from general or particular revelation, and they 
                     
16 Ackerman, "The political case for constitutional courts", 
p. 209. 
21 
contrast it with the elegant complexity of a philosophical 
argument by Rawls (say) or Dworkin.17 
In the following pages I want to question the self-
sufficiency of the “secular theorist”. I want to explain that 
the reasons why we misunderstand our own political language 
are the same reasons why the “secular theorists” Waldron 
refers to cannot understand theological language as anything 
but a language based on the discussion of magical events, of 
crude prescriptions from God, backed up with threat of 
hellfire, derived from general or particular revelation. This 
is the key to political theology. 
Political Theology 
The idea of political theology is much more radical than the 
thesis, interesting but nowadays transformed into a 
commonplace, that “All significant concepts of the modern 
theory of the state are secularized theological concepts.”18 
In its most powerful sense, the idea behind political 
theology is not a thesis about the genealogy of political 
concepts, but about their meaning, what we shall later call 
their mode of signifying. Since they use the same mode of 
signifying, the unintelligibility of the political concepts 
we have noted is the unintelligibility of theological 
concepts. This is concealed because, as opposed to political 
concepts, theological concepts do not seem unintelligible 
(they only seem plainly and ridiculously false: “magical”). 
But theological concepts so rejected or accepted are 
theologically distorted concepts, they are forms of idolatry. 
This is the reason why there is not much, in my view, to be 
                     
17 Waldron, God, Locke and Equality, p. 20. 
18 Schmitt, Political Theology, p. 36. 
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said about political theology without going into theological 
questions (one cannot do political theology without 
theology). 
In choosing a point of entry into theological questions 
one can do far worse than paying special attention to the 
distinction between faith and idolatry, because this goes 
right to the hearth of the problem of theological language. 
As Simone Weil said, 
There are two atheisms of which one is a purification of the 
notion of God. 
 Of two men who have no experience of God, he who denies 
him is perhaps nearer to him than the other. 
 Religion in so far as it is a source of consolation is a 
hindrance to true faith: in this sense atheism is a 
purification.19 
Now, the thesis that political concepts are theological 
concepts and vice versa, implies something quite precise: it 
means that their mode of signifying is the same, and 
therefore that their pathologies are analogue. From the point 
of view of theology, the point has been brilliantly 
identified by Juan Luis Segundo: 
We are more interested in the (apparently dated) antithesis 
between faith and idolatry than in the (apparently topical) 
antithesis between faith and atheism. Furthermore, it has to 
be said at the outset that those who call themselves 
Christians can occupy, in the more radical antithesis 
                     
19 Weil, Gravity and Grace, pp. 114, 115. Likewise Karl 
Rahner said that “If we say "God" we must not imagine that 
everyone understands this word and that the only question is 
whether what all mean by it really exists. Very often the man 
in the street believes it to mean something which he rightly 
denies, because what he imagines it to mean really does not 
exist. He thinks it is a hypothesis for explaining phenomena 
until science can give the true explanation, or someone to 
frighten children until they realize that nothing 
extraordinary happens if they are naughty” Rahner, "The 
Little Word 'God'". 
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faith/idolatry, either of these positions. In other words, we 
believe that men are more profoundly divided by their image 
of God than by the position they take as to whether that 
image corresponds to something real.20 
In order to explore the political meaning of the antithesis 
‘faith-idolatry’ the best starting point seems to be, 
precisely, the idea of “negative theology” which Ackerman 
mentions without even trying to understand it. 
Negative theology (i): The creation of the world 
Rowan Williams has perceptively warned that “theology is 
perennially liable to be seduced by the opportunity to ignore 
the question of how it learns its own language.”21 Maybe it 
is possible to understand Thomas Aquinas’ “negative theology” 
(so-called “apophatic” theology) as an attempt to make 
explicit his awareness of the danger of seduction identified 
by Williams. The sense in which Aquinas’ theology is negative 
is expressed in one of his capital points about our knowledge 
of God: 
When the existence of a thing has been ascertained, there 
remains the further question of the manner of its existence, 
in order that we may know its essence. Now, because we cannot 
know what God is, but rather what He is not, we have no means 
for considering how God is, but rather how he is not.22 
The way in which I want to exploit this idea is that theology 
uses an inverted language. Thus, the statement that God is 
“our father” is a statement about universal human 
brotherhood. This is because 
                     
20 Segundo, Teología Abierta para el Laico Adulto. Gracia y 
Condición humana, p. 22. 
21 Williams, "Trinity and revelation", p. 131. 
22 McCabe, "Aquinas' Summa Theologiae. Volume 3, Knowing and 
Naming God: 1a. 12-13", Ia q2. 
24 
when we speak of God, although we know how to use our words, 
there is an important sense in which we do not know what they 
mean. Fundamentally this is because of our special ignorance 
of God. We know how to talk about shoes and ships because of 
our understanding of shoes and ships. We know how to talk 
about God, not because of any understanding of God, but 
because of what we know about his creatures.23 
“God, maker of heaven and earth, of all things visible and 
invisible” is a good start, among other things, because it 
refers to the paradigm of “religious” statements that 
Waldron’s “secular authors” have in mind. Richard Dawkins, 
for example, defines what he takes to be the “more 
defensible” version of “the God hypothesis” in the following 
way: 
there exists a superhuman, supernatural intelligence who 
deliberately designed and created the universe and everything 
in it, including us.24 
And of course, in these terms, 
God’s existence or non-existence is a scientific fact about 
the universe, discoverable in principle if not in practice. 
If he existed and chose to reveal it, God himself could 
clinch the argument, noisily and unequivocally, in his 
favour.25 
But this is precisely “cataphatic”, positive theology: it 
assumes we may know what God is: a super-wizard, which is 
idolatry (a super golden calf). The alternative to idolatry 
is negative theology. Therefore, we must understand that the 
meaning of the phrase “God, maker of heaven and earth, of all 
things visible and invisible” is not to be found in what it 
                     
23 McCabe, "Signifying imperfectly". 
24 Dawkins, The God Delusion, p. 31. 
25 ibid, p. 50. Dawkins does not explain the reader what is a 
“scientific fact” and how it can be distinguished from other, 
non-scientific facts. 
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positively affirms about God. But the statement seems to be 
about what God is (it has God as a subject: the maker of 
heaven and earth, i.e. the world, in the sense of all that is 
the case), so in order to understand its way of signifying it 
must be inverted. It then becomes a statement, not about God, 
but about the world: “God, maker of the world” implies “the 
world is something created”. Notice: it is not that since we 
have independent reason to believe in God’s existence that we 
believe that, since He is such a powerful person, He is the 
creator of all that is visible and invisible. We express our 
faith that the world is a created thing by saying that God 
made it ex nihilo. God is whatever is necessary to understand 
the world as something created. 
If the claim that God created the world ex nihilo is 
understood in a positive manner, it seems hard to avoid some 
form of idolatry. It will have to be taken as a thesis about 
the (temporal) origin of the world: that there was a moment, 
at the beginning of time (as if this expression could 
possibly mean something), in which the world was created by a 
wizard of fabulous powers. But the (temporal) origin of the 
world (and the existence of such a wizard) is a fact about 
the world, and is difficult to deny that such a fact, like 
any other fact, is prima facie verifiable (a “scientific” 
fact). The distortion contained in this interpretation 
becomes evident when one remembers that Aquinas, for example, 
believed that the idea of the world created by God ex nihilo 
was in principle perfectly compatible with the thesis that 
the world is eternal, that it does not have a beginning.26 
                     
26  
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Now, what does the idea of creation, in its inverted 
meaning, say about the world? First, that the world is not 
sacred, that it is not God (it is the negation of every form 
of pantheism, which does not distinguish God from the world). 
But it also expresses confidence in the answer to what might 
be called “the most fundamental question of philosophy”: Why 
is there something rather than nothing? Or, in Wittgenstein’s 
formulation, “It is not how things are in the world that is 
mystical, but that it exists.”27 Not knowing anything 
affirmative about God implies ignorance of the answer (the 
believer does not have, qua believer, any special access to 
privileged knowledge), but faith in that there is an answer. 
This faith in the existence of an answer to the question 
about the meaning of the fact that the world is might be 
expressed in the following way: the world is like the  Ninth 
Symphony or Hamlet, which exist because they are the 
expression of somebody’s genius. Understanding the Ninth 
Symphony as a creation, namely, as someone’s work is to 
understand it as something with meaning. But it is clear that 
the Ninth Symphony or Hamlet only provide an analogy, because 
neither Beethoven nor Shakespeare could create ex nihilo. In 
fact, both Hamlet and the Ninth Symphony could only be 
created in the context of existing practices, and the genius 
of their authors is to be found in the way in which they were 
capable of organizing forms of artistic expression that were 
around when they arrive to the world (remember Hannah 
Arendt’s insight that this obvious fact: that the world was 
there when we arrived and will be there when we leave, is a 
fundamental part of the human condition). This means that the 
                     
27 Wittgenstein, Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, §6.44. 
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sense in which we talk about the Ninth Symphony or Hamlet as 
created things presupposes something prior to them that was 
not created: they are not, we could say, radically created. 
When we ask about the status of a parcel of the world the 
answer may be partial: when the question is ‘why the world’ 
the answer has to be radical. Therefore Shakespeare and 
Beethoven are “creators” in much less radical a way than God. 
This implies that although theological language is an 
inverted language, the inversion is necessary, it is not 
dispensable. “God is the creator of heaven and earth, of all 
things visible and invisible” implies but is not reducible to 
“the world is something created”. The second statement gives 
us a hint about the way in which the first statement 
signifies, but the meaning of the first is not reducible to 
the meaning of the second. 
Why insist, as Christian theology does, on the idea of a 
personal God instead of a cooler Hellenist unmoved mover? Is 
this not affirming something positive about God? A brief 
answer could be: because God cannot be the answer (or, 
strictly speaking: the name given to the confidence in the 
existence of an answer) to Wittgenstein’s mystical question 
and be impersonal at the same time. If God were impersonal, 
then it would not be part of the explanation, but part of 
what needs to be explained: being the first does not stop a 
motor from being a motor. A motor is something that can be 
used, if we know how to use it. This is not the case of a 
“person”: to recognize something as a person is to recognize 
its character as an end in itself. The thesis that God is 
“personal”, thus, is also a negative thesis, not positive, 
because 
what this truly and blessedly means is that God cannot be 
less than man, endowed with personality, freedom and love, 
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and that the mystery itself is free protective love, not an 
"objective order" which one can, after all, possess (at least 
in principle), and against which one could insure oneself.28 
Thus the idea that God cannot be an impersonal force 
(something that can be instrumentally used) may be expressed 
by saying that God is a person. As can be seen, in these 
terms the choice is also between a personal God and an 
idolatrous understanding of God. When we speak about 
ourselves, the way to express that human beings are ends and 
not means is to say that they are “persons”. The idea of a 
personal God expresses the same about God, but in a radical 
manner. This means that the fact that God is a person does 
not entitle us to say of God what we say of us: that God has 
intentions, plans, wishes, will, etc. Almost all of our 
positive language related to the term “person” is determined 
by the fundamental fact about human beings: they have (we 
have) bodies that develop and decay. And of course, God does 
not have a body, because otherwise God would be part of the 
world. Therefore God is a “person” like us in the same sense 
in which he “creates” like Beethoven or Shakespeare. 
The point here is that our language about God is a 
language that cannot account for itself. That is why it must 
rely on analogies (like “creator”) or metaphors (like 
“father”). In short, it must use what Hegel called 
“representations.”29 And, of course, the first representation 
is “god”. Indeed, “God” is a pagan word which was 
appropriated by Christian theology in order to say: there are 
no gods. But it is a word which shows no meaning at all, that 
                     
28 Rahner, "The Little Word 'God'". 
29 On Hegel’s idea of “representations” (Vorstellung), see 
Taylor, Hegel, pp. 480-509. 
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operates as if it were a proper name.30 The reason why this 
is so is that when we talk about God we are talking whereof 
cannot be spoken. The fact that we can speak about it is not 
a reason to remain in silent, but to keep constantly in mind 
that we are that we are “stretching language to breaking 
point”, so that it is “precisely as it breaks that the 
communication, if any, is achieved.”31 
Negative theology (ii): negative political theology 
I want to show now that everything we have been discussing 
can be understood politically. This task has been facilitated 
by Professor Carlos Pérez’s notable book, Proposición de un 
Marxismo Hegeliano. The reason Pérez gives in the 
introduction of his book for “recurring to Marx once again” 
are indeed negative: 
For his idea that the communist goal, the end of class 
struggle, is possible. For his radical critique against 
capitalist exploitation … . Against all forms of naturalism, 
against the idea of human finitude, so characteristic of the 
culture of defeat.32 
Pérez postulates, as the basis of his Hegelian Marxism, what 
he calls a “theory of alienation”, which is, in its turn, 
grounded 
on an absolute historicism, in which every object is 
objectified by the human action of producing its whole being. 
The political reason for affirming so counterintuitive a 
fundament is to avoid all traces of naturalism, all 
possibility of appealing to elements that, starting from 
human nature or the human condition, put limits to the 
possibility of ending class struggle. What is stated here, as 
the basis, is a radical affirmation of human infinitude … . 
Without these founding statements we can project as an 
                     
30 Rahner, "The Little Word 'God'" 
31 McCabe, God matters, p. 177. 
32 Pérez, Proposición de un Marxismo Hegeliano, p. 9. 
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utopian horizon a better humanity, but never a humanity that 
is essentially free.33 
But the idea of alienation implies that there is no way of 
knowing what is for humanity to be “essentially free”. This 
cannot be seen from our alienated perspective; to talk about 
it is, again, talking whereof we cannot talk. Pérez explains 
this point with his distinction between lie, error and 
alienation. What characterizes these three situations is the 
difference between discourse and action. But in the cases of 
lying and error this gap is a phenomenon of the conscience: 
she who lies may get to recognize she is lying, and she who 
errs may come to recognize her mistake.34 But alienation is 
different: it cannot be overcome simply at the level of 
consciousness, by just realizing that one is alienated: 
It is not the case that you are alienated. It is, rather, 
that you are your alienation. And you cannot overcome it 
until you change what you are … . In a situation of 
alienation, there is no non-alienated point of view … . Only 
from the point of view of other alienation it is possible to 
see the alienation. This means that overcoming it cannot be 
an epistemological process (making the truth appear) but only 
a specifically political process.35 
But how can we understand what it would be like to be in a 
non-alienated situation? If there is no non-alienated point 
of view in an alienated situation, how can we even describe 
the idea of a non-alienated life? What is important here is 
the experience of a deficit: 
Suffering that drives us towards breaking the relation that 
constitutes it, in order to change life itself. The possible 
mobility of the alienated conscience is given by the 
flagrant, existential, empirical contradiction, between that 
                     
33 ibid, 71. 
34 ibid, 88 
35 ibid, 89 
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which is harmonized by conscience and that which is suffered 
in immediate experience.36 
What Pérez has called “a suffering” is an existential 
experience of deficit. This experience of deficit flows from 
the contradictions of our forms of life, the fact that they 
promise what they cannot give. We may get to formulate the 
idea of a non-alienated life through a radicalization of such 
unfulfilled promises. What makes the conscience of alienation 
as well as its overcoming action possible is the fact that 
what is experienced as a deficit may be identified as a 
deficit (i.e., it is not harmonized). This refusal not to 
experience it as a deficit can be described as faith in human 
infinitude: in the possibility of non-alienated life. 
The anthropological thesis that is discussed here is that 
exploitation is, originally, a survival strategy against 
scarcity, a strategy progressively objectified through 
history [… .] That human beings have no internal tendency to 
oppress […] or subjugate […] is not, and cannot be, an 
empirical thesis. It is a matter of principle, driven by the 
conclusion one wants to arrive at. If these tendencies 
existed (as part of the human nature, the human condition or 
as a biological basis of conduct) communism would be 
impossible. If one wishes to arrive at that conclusion it 
must be excluded from the premises.37 
The conditions under which alienation can be identified, 
however, are unlikely to be maintained. This is because what 
allows the individual to identify his or her alienation is 
consciousness of a deficit, which implies that he or she must 
face a “generally painful and catastrophic” situation. This 
condition appears as cognitive dissonance, a contradiction 
between what is harmonized by conscience and suffered by 
experience. The dissonance is reduced by denial, which 
                     
36 ibid, 90. 
37 ibid, 109. 
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neutralizes the deficit. This denial assumes one of two 
forms: on the one hand, the liberal (or conservative) 
answer38: there is no deficit, because a mature understanding 
                     
38 In the politically relevant sense, the expressions 
“liberal” and “conservative” are equivalent. In the 
apparently most popular antithesis, these two terms are 
politically opposed: but in the radical antithesis, these two 
terms are analogous and they both oppose to “socialism”. The 
matter is discussed with certain detail in Atria, "Veinte 
años después, neoliberalismo con rostro humano". This may be 
one of the reasons why “academic” discussions seem so 
detached from actually existing politics: those discussions 
do not capture the oppositions that are really important. 
This is the case, for example, with the so-called “liberal-
communitarian debate”, labels that, in North American 
academic vocabulary, correspond to the liberal/conservative 
distinction. Paul Kahn has noticed very much the same point 
in his Putting Liberalism in its Place, where he claims that 
that liberalism and communitarianism  are, concerning the 
relevant issues, analogous, a thesis as implausible at first 
sight as it is correct. 
 To express this larger point briefly, both liberals and 
conservatives settle for this world: the conservative because 
he ascribes normativity to the traditional order he discovers 
in the world, the liberal because he believes that the 
subject, the human being (not the order), is natural, and 
therefore the only thing we can do is to order their 
interactions so they can live without attacking each other. 
They both deny human being’s infinitude, because they both 
think there is no hope in this world (the very idea of an 
“essentially free” humanity is meaningless to them): for the 
conservative because he thinks that if there is hope it is in 
other world, completely alien to this one (thus it is 
politically irrelevant), and for the liberal because there is 
nothing more than the actually existing world. 
 The fundamental equivalence of liberals and conservatives 
makes its more concrete oppositions, about this or that legal 
reform proposal, to pale in comparison. This equivalence is 
particularly pristine (pace its author, which gives it 
greater value) in Gray, Black Mass. Gray’s thesis is that 
what characterizes modern political discourse is its 
apocalyptic dimension: “Modern politics is a chapter in the 
history of religion” is the books opening phrase. Thus, this 
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of the human condition (enhanced nowadays by volumes of neo-
darwinism) will show us that human beings are “naturally” 
wolves to each other, so that the only meaning of politics is 
                                                               
is the same thesis defended in this paper. Gray, 
nevertheless, thinks this is modernity’s curse, because all 
apocalyptic comprehension of politics leads to terror and 
totalitarianism: “all societies contain divergent ideals of 
life. When a utopian regime collides with this fact the 
result can only be repression or defeat. Utopianism does no 
cause totalitarianism – for a totalitarian regime to come 
into being many other factors are necessary – but 
totalitarianism follows whenever the dream of a life without 
conflict is consistently pursued through the use of state 
power” (53). Indeed, if this claim can be associated with 
someone in particular, the most obvious candidate is not a 
conservative but a liberal thinker, Isaiah Berlin. 
 Both liberalism and conservatism are defined by the idea 
that the actually existing world, with its conflicts as they 
appear to us today, is as good as it gets. Gray claims that 
this is only asserted by conservatives, but at the price of 
forcing an obviously implausible millenarist interpretation 
of liberalism. Now, if Gray is right and totalitarianism is 
the consequence of pursuing a completely human form of life 
through politics, then we will have to choose between 
conservatism and liberalism (that is the reason why after the 
fall of Berlin’s Wall so many leftists followed Berlin and 
became liberals). But Gray is wrong, because he identifies 
the origins of totalitarianism incorrectly. Totalitarianism 
does not originate in the idea that a world is possible in 
which the unity of particular and general interest is 
transparent. It originates in the idea that to achieve this 
it is necessary to ignore actually existing human beings and 
their (our) forms of life, because they are completely 
worthless. It is the idea that, because they are alienated, 
the interests, wishes and beliefs of actually existing 
individuals are irrelevant, that they may be ignored in order 
to hasten the birth of the new man. Later on this will be 
discussed by reference to the idea of Revolution and what 
will be called the “Portalian principle”. Because what Gray’s 
argument legitimately brings into question is not the idea of 
a world free from alienation, but the idea of Revolution 
which, as we will see, is where the main problem of Pérez’s 
argument lies. 
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to hold each person at bay in order to make our co-existence 
possible. The second form of denial (which is nothing but the 
symmetrical reflection of the first) is the one taken by 
those that Engels called “infantile communists”, those who 
imagine that, merely because they want to skip the 
intermediate stations and compromises, the matter is settled, 
and if ’it begins’ in the next few days—which they take for 
granted—and they take over power, ’communism will be 
introduced’ the day after tomorrow. If that is not 
immediately possible, they are not Communists.39  
The first denies alienation because it denies that 
reconciliation among really existing individuals is possible, 
either because there is a natural tendency to violence and 
domination within them, which may be controlled but not 
eliminated, or because reconciliation will be reached only in 
paradise, understood as something completely alien to this 
vale of tears. When they are optimists, they say we can 
expect a “better humanity” (namely, one with a bigger GDP) 
but “not an essentially free humanity.” 
The second, on the other hand, denies alienation by 
treating it as a phenomenon of the conscience, which may be 
solved simply by “realizing” that one is alienated (a state 
at which, in fact, he or she has already arrived, so that the 
only thing necessary for the instauration of Communism is his 
or her obtaining control). Perez’s idea of alienation as 
foundation (or at least the way in which I interpret it 
here), implies that in a deep political sense liberals 
(conservatives) and infantile communists are equivalent, 
because neither understands the way in which actually 
                     
39 Engels, "El Programa de los Emigrados Blanquistas de la 
Comuna". The passage is quoted at the beginning of Ch. VIII 
of Lenin, "Left-wing" Communism, an Infantile Disorder. 
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existing institutions can legitimately claim our allegiance. 
The liberal, who accepts the world for what it is, must claim 
that law is not the will of the people if by “the people” 
anything greater than the sum total of individuals is meant. 
But then of course the obvious problem is grounding the 
obligation to obey a law that one opposes but that was passed 
anyway because, for example, the lobby of some particular 
pressure group was highly effective. Democratic theory says 
that, in a politically relevant sense, that law is still my 
will because it is our will, but for the liberal this is 
overloaded rhetoric.  
The infantile communist, on the other hand, will flatly 
deny the legitimacy of any actually existing democratic 
institution, because to him or her the function of 
institutions is always the same: to mask exploitation. For 
them the idea that law is the will of the people is also 
overheated rhetoric, but in this case its function is 
ideological. 
What is common to both is that they fail to understand 
political discourse and its particular mode of signifying. It 
is this mode of signifying that politics shares with 
theology. Political concepts signify, as theological ones, 
imperfectly. 
 
The idea of representation (metaphors or analogies) provides 
us with a new perspective from which we can try to understand 
our political institutions. Before, the dilemma was that in 
order to recognise their claim on our loyalty we had to 
either deny that they embody a systematic deficit (to do this 
we must change our understanding of the institution –the 
point of democracy being that heads will be “contadas y no 
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cortadas,” in Norberto Bobbio’s expression) or we had to 
recognise the deficit and claim that because of it 
institutions are “merely ideological” and thus false. The 
problem is that the infantile communist is right in claiming 
that there is a systematic deficit inherent in institutions: 
they exist because something must be made probable, and the 
obvious question concerning any institution is its necessary: 
why is cooperation unlikely without the institution of 
contract law? The existence of the institution, in other 
words, is in itself a deficit, and it is crucial to remain 
aware of this, because the experience of the deficit as 
deficit is the necessary condition for identifying our 
alienation as such without assuming an impossibly non-
alienated perspective. 
Hence the liberal is right in claiming that actual 
institutions, with their actual  shortcomings, do have a 
claim on our loyalty. But since he or she will not admit 
signifying imperfectly, they believe that to say this, the 
deficit must be ignored or wished away. And with this they 
invite us to abandon the crucial perspective that stems from 
the experience of the deficit. 
Since actually existing institutions are in themselves 
the mark of a deficit, all institutions have two faces: one 
emancipatory and one oppressive. The law of contract is an 
explication of what is to cooperate for two individuals who 
recognise each other and refuse to behave instrumentally 
towards the other. But individuals can assume this position 
for instrumental reasons. Generally speaking, institutions 
are false (there will be no institutions in the Kingdom of 
God or under Communism) but in their falsehood they teach us: 
it is by living under them we can see from afar what a non-
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alienated life looks like. For this reason, we can  be loyal 
to institutions without denying their deficits. But this 
loyalty never loses its ironic quality, insofar as the form 
of life we live in is necessarily dehumanized, insufficient. 
This ironic loyalty is based on faith: faith that what is 
inhuman in the world world we live in can be overcome, 
because it is not a fatal and necessary consequence of our 
nature, but of our forms of life: forms of life that accustom 
us to show “incredible levels of indifference towards the 
pain of others.”40 And as it is a consequence of our 
alienated forms of life, it is possible, in principle, to 
live humanly: if we could only live under truly humane forms 
of life! What could these forms of life be like? The whole 
point of a theory of alienation like the one defended by 
Pérez, or at least the sense I have of it here, is that we 
cannot answer this question: there is no point of view free 
from alienation in an alienated situation. But we may know 
some aspects of our forms of life that will not exist: there 
will be no opposition of class interests (which means: there 
will be no class differences), there will be no 
objectification, no exploitation.  We know that because those 
are the conditions that lead to the existential experience of 
deficit. And as we cannot affirmatively know what these non-
alienated forms of life will be like, we cannot truly say 
anything about them. But here we have to follow 
Wittgenstein’s example and disregard the advice he himself 
contradicted in the very act of giving it. 
                     
40 Pérez, Proposición de un Marxismo Hegeliano, p. 62. 
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Sacraments 
Once again the idea that we are speaking whereof we cannot 
speak. Maybe because of that we should remember Pérez’s 
observation: speaking is not enough, because alienation is 
not a phenomenon of the conscience, but of life. In 
theological terms, this implies the notion of sacrament and 
of sacramental practices. 
 In Christian theology, sacraments are signs of God’s 
presence among us. That is to say, they are signs of the 
possibility of radical reconciliation, of complete human 
fulfillment, in a world where reconciliation and such 
fulfillment are impossible. Therefore, they are signs that, 
as Aquinas said, “signify imperfectly”. Their signifying 
imperfectly does not mean they are false, but rather that 
their full meaning is inaccessible to us given our forms of 
life (forms which Pérez would say are constituted by 
alienation, Aquinas would say: constituted by sin). And of 
course, in the Kingdom of God those signs will be unnecessary 
(and that is why in the Kingdom of God the virtues of faith 
and hope will disappear). An understanding of politics that 
avoids the symmetrical errors of someone who believes that 
what we see today is as good as it gets and someone who 
thinks that a non-alienated life can be brought about just by 
seizing power and rearranging things “the right way” is what 
we could call a sacramental understanding of politics: our 
institutions are (or at least may be) signs of that which is 
unknown: living non-alienated lives. 
Here it might be useful to put it another way: 
alienation consists in seeing the other’s interest as opposed 
to my own. Because our interests are (seen to be) in 
conflict, it is unlike that we will spontaneously agree in 
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our identification of what is in our common interest. What is 
likely is that I will try to use whatever means I have to get 
you to agree to what is in my interest (indeed, if I manage 
to convince you that your interests are served when you serve 
mine, I will have thoroughly succeeded) -- and you will do 
the same. The function of democratic institutions is to make 
likely what is unlikely: that the norms that we shall 
recognize serve everybody’s interests, and not only those of 
the powerful. 
A “sacramental” understanding of those institutions 
allows us to show an ironic commitment to them. It is a form 
of commitment, because in our conditions it is the only way 
to express (and live according to) the idea that the only 
source of normativity is one common to everyone’s 
perspective. But it is ironic, because we know that law as an 
institution does not live up to its own promises. And note 
that it does not live up to them because it cannot do so: if 
it could, the fundamental commonality of interests among 
humankind would be transparent to us; that is to say, we 
would have overcome our alienation. But had we reached that 
condition, the institution would no longer be necessary, 
because the necessity of this institution is the deficit of 
our alienated forms of life. This is the meaning of the 
Marxist idea that under communism, law would disappear, as 
well as the meaning of the Thomist observation that in the 
Kingdom there will be no sacraments. Just like religion is 
the soul of a soulless world, law is the will of a community 
that has no community of wills. 
The fact that both political and theological language 
cannot but use representations (metaphors and analogies), 
implies that their pathologies are also the same. Indeed, 
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because of this pathology it seems as though we are living 
under the domain of dead ideas. The pathology is losing sight 
of the fact that representations are just that: 
representations, instead taking them as literal descriptions. 
The origin of this pathology lies in the temptation to deny 
the contradiction between promise and delivery on which they 
are based, and thus lose sight of the possibility of an 
ironic commitment, which if not resisted reduces our 
possibilities to naïve devotion or cynical irony. 
If the representations to which theological and 
political language recur must be understood literally, then 
they are evidently false and must be abandoned. Those who 
assume this position are likely to ask: do you really believe 
the consecrated wafer is a piece of human flesh? That the 
world appeared magically in six 24-hour days? That the earth 
is no more than 10.000 years old? That law is truly 
everyone’s will and not the will of an “elite”?  For this 
line of criticism, splendidly illustrated nowadays by the 
recent (and banal) books written by the high priests of neo-
darwinism, Richard Dawkins41 and Daniel Dennet,42 as well as 
in the school called “public choice,” all theological 
language, in addition to the political language of the 
democratic tradition, is complete nonsense.  Since these 
critics do not even understand the literary genre (i.e., the 
figurative mode of signification) of theological or political 
discourse, their admonitions are ridiculously irrelevant.43 
                     
41 Dawkins, The God Delusion. 
42 Dennet, Breaking the Spell. 
43 These critics, which call themselves “brights” (ibid, 21) 
define what they criticize by reference to the belief in 
representations literally understood: “For some people, 
prayer is not literally talking to God but, rather, a 
 
41 
                                                               
"symbolic" activity, a way of talking to oneself about one's 
deepest concerns, expressed metaphorically. It is rather like 
beginning a diary entry with “Dear Diary." If what they call 
God is really not an agent in their eyes, a being that can 
answer prayers, approve and disapprove, receive sacrifices, 
and mete out punishment or forgiveness, then, although they 
may call this Being God, and stand in awe of it (not Him), 
their creed, whatever it is, is not really a religion 
according to my definition” (10). In other words, Dennet 
defines “religion” on the basis of the literalness of its 
representations: religion, in his definition, is “a social 
systems whose participants avow belief in a supernatural 
agent or agents whose approval is to be sought” (9).  
 The ease of Dennett’s move from “him” to “it” shows that 
he and those he criticizes occupy the same position in 
Segundo’s “more interesting” dichotomy (between faith and 
idolatry). Indeed, both of them take the language they use 
for granted (oddly enough, it is authors like Dennet or 
Dawkins who are specially liable to forget Williams’ 
warning). Therefore his stipulations are quite difficult to 
comment, since in some sense he is completely right. But not 
in the sense he imagines to be. It may be said about the idea 
of “religion” that it is a corrupt notion, incompatible with 
faith. As François Varone has claimed, “para la religión, 
Dios es un poder que el hombre ha de hacer reaccionar en 
provecho propio. Para la fe, por el contrario, es Dios quien 
actúa, quien hace vivir al hombre, y éste ha de acogerlo. 
Sobre esta primera ruptura se esboza inmediatamente una 
segunda. La religión espera inducir a Dios a intervenir 
útilmente para hacer realidad los deseos y necesidades del 
hombre [... .] Para la fe, por el contrario, Dios hace 
ciertamente existir al creyente, da aliento a su libertad, 
luz a su búsqueda de sentido, pero no interviene útilmente a 
favor del hombre. Dios deja que el hombre cargue con todo el 
peso de su vida y del mundo y los lleve a su realización. No 
viene, una vez creído y aceptado por el creyente, a 
transformar los cactos en terciopelo: los abismos concretos 
de falta de sentido – muerte y depresión, violencia y hambre, 
esclavitud y cáncer – todo ello permanece inmutado” (Varone, 
El Dios Ausente, p. 83. See generally ibid, 15-79, the first 
part of the book, called “Religion, atheism and faith”. 
Notice how Varone’s three categories match those of Segundo: 
idolatry, atheism and faith). 
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Or, better, they are or would be for a self-conscious 
theology or political understanding. The reason why their 
admonitions might have sense today is the symmetric but 
inverse pathology of religion; if Dawkins and Dennett believe 
that metaphors and religious representations are meant to be 
literal descriptions and that as such they are obviously 
false, the idolatrous agree with them in the former but 
disagrees in the latter (believing they are true). They go to 
court to claim that the story of Genesis ought to be 
understood as a theory alternative to Darwin’s about the 
origin of life on earth. Here religion becomes a way out of 
this vale of tears, and is eternally projected outwards: it 
tells us nothing about this life, except that we must endure 
it in order to gain access, once we have served our time down 
here, to a better and truer one. Thus, this idea ignores that 
“God” is a metaphor, that the meaning of God is that there 
are no gods, and worships an idol defined by its fabulous 
powers, whose most portentous demonstration has been the 
“intelligent design” of everything that is. Politically 
speaking, they correspond to the neo-constitutionalist who 
believes that injustice in our forms of life is a phenomenon 
of pure conscience, and that, were he or she appointed to the 
Constitutional Court, true justice would follow the very next 
day. 
Here we must return to Juan Luis Segundo’s antithesis. 
In the antithesis faith/atheism Dawkins opposes those who 
condemn evolution because it contradicts the Book of Genesis 
just as the infantile communist opposes the 
liberal/conservative. But in the antithesis faith/idolatry 
(Varone: faith/religion), Dawkins and those who see God as a 
super-wizard concur, and they oppose those whose faith is 
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free of idolatry, in the same way the infantile and the 
liberal (conservative) are against those who exhibit an 
ironic (i.e., sacramental) commitment to our actually 
existing institutions. 
The Protestant principle 
Political theology is the thesis that the modes of signifying 
of theological and political discourses are the same. We have 
seen that by adopting the theological-political point of view 
we can re-draw a familiar landscape in which traditional 
antagonisms are equivalent in an important sense. What makes 
them equivalent is their rejection of political theology, 
i.e., their rejection of politics as a language structurally 
analogous to theology (i.e., that they are based on the same 
mode of signifying). By ignoring the fact that our political 
language signifies imperfectly, they are forced to deny the 
contradiction we live in, and must then embrace one horn 
while ignoring the other: it means either settling for this 
world or rejecting it altogether. Since the possible movement 
of alienated consciousness is grounded in the existential 
experience of this contradiction (Perez dixit), this denial 
amounts to the radicalization of alienation, insofar as it 
hides that which permits its identification. But nonetheless 
(or maybe precisely because of it) these positions are 
attractive, as they reduce cognitive dissonance and allow us 
to continue with our lives. 
How can we maintain the tension in spite of normality’s 
brutal levelling force? What I have called a sacramental 
understanding of our institutions is, of course, the first 
step. But, is this a stable understanding? Is it possible for 
a sacramental understanding of politics to subsist in normal 
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times, in the face of the levelling force of normality? (The 
traditional leftist objection against social-democracy was 
precisely this: normality transforms citizens into clients, 
because the spirit that grounds social-democratic 
institutions cannot survive the normal operation of the 
institution; hence they create new forms of alienation, 
rather than emancipation. That the “revolutionary” left has 
been defeated and that the social-democratic option is 
somewhat more attractive nowadays should not make us forget 
these objections, for they point to a truly fundamental 
problem). In my opinion, the survival of our political 
practices depends on the answer to this question. This is 
what it means to live under the domain of dead ideas. Given 
the question’s breadth, it would be derisory to pretend to 
give a full answer here, but we may try to move a step closer 
by availing ourselves of what Paul Tillich called “the 
Protestant principle”: 
Protestantism has a principle that stands beyond all its 
realizations. It is the critical and dynamic source of all 
Protestant realizations, but it is not identical with any of 
them. It cannot be confined by a definition. It is not 
exhausted by any historical religion; it is not identical 
with the structure of the Reformation or of early 
Christianity or even with a religious form at all. It 
transcends them as it transcends any cultural form. On the 
other hand, it can appear in all of them; it is a living, 
moving, restless power in them [... It] contains the divine 
and human protest against any absolute claim made for a 
relative reality, even if this claim is made by a Protestant 
church. The Protestant principle is the judge of every 
religious and cultural reality.”44 
The last sentences reveals that what Tillich calls the 
“PProtestant principle” is not really Protestant: it is the 
                     
44 Tillich, The Protestant Era, cap. 11. 
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assumption made by all theological reflection that heeds 
Williams’ warning, that is to say, that remains aware that it 
must always account for its own language: for the moment in 
which representations fossilize and claim to provide a full 
account of what they represent - specifically, the moment in 
which metaphors are no longer understood as metaphors but 
rather as literal descriptions – faith becomes a set of 
false, irrational and supernatural beliefs (i.e., idolatry). 
It ceases to be faith in the possibility of a non-alienated 
human life and becomes a conspicuous sign of alienation. 
In fact, the Protestant principle has to be a Catholic 
principle, because Catholicism insists on a politically 
central dimension. One of the distinctive characteristics of 
Catholicism is its insistence on tradition as a source of 
revelation, which in turn implies the special relevance of 
the institutional aspect of the Church. As Schmitt claimed, 
Catholicism is an idea of representation by means of 
institutions.45 Institutions are formalized traditions. 
Tradition, on the other hand, is a common history, a 
collective biography.46 But it is a biography whose meaning 
only appears when it is read according to the Protestant 
principle, for only then can revelation be understood not as 
a truth fallen from the sky and communicated to us from the 
                     
45 Schmitt, Roman Catholicism and political form. 
46 This is the reason why a tradition needs a principle of 
identity, something of which we can say that the tradition is 
the history of. And the institutionalization that marks 
Catholic Christianity off was precisely a compensation for 
the deficit of identity implied by Christian universalism: 
from early on, Christianly was understood not as the religion 
of a (naturally defined) people, but of humanity. The lack of 
any natural feature that could provide a principle of 
identity is offset artificially, by the institutional Church. 
See Segundo, El Dogma que Libera, pp. 190-193. 
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outside, without denying its radical opposition to this world 
of sin (as 19th century liberal theology did). The Protestant 
principle enables us to understand tradition as the effort of 
successive generations to give finite form to what is 
infinite, historicity to that which transcends history. This 
is possible only to the extent that tradition itself does not 
seem alien, that is to say, that members of the tradition 
understand that they have a specially responsibility towards 
it. Tradition becomes alien when it forgets the Protestant 
principle. Speaking of a tradition as the Christian tradition 
in general or Catholicism in particular, there is nothing 
strange about its being, in the same sense as Perez’s 
Marxism, opposed to this world. This is precisely the point: 
it is the sigh of the oppressed creature, the heart of a 
heartless world, the soul of a soulless environment. This 
opposition may be called eschatological, or anticipatory, 
because it has a sacramental dimension in the sense we have 
already seen. But since we are talking of actually existing 
traditions and institutions, it is possible and even likely 
that this opposition to the world will be due, as least as 
well, to the fact that the institutional forms of the 
tradition, since they exist in this world, have become 
corrupted.47 Distinguishing these two reasons for the 
opposition between tradition and the world is what it means 
to belong to a tradition that is not experienced as alien, a 
tradition one is responsible for. Tillich’s “Protestant 
principle” is the modulation of this idea. It keeps 
constantly open the possibility that accepting what we 
receive is not a form of showing loyalty, but a way of 
                     
47 McCabe, Law, Love and Language, p. 155. 
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betraying one’s tradition. That is why the fact that the 
Church is a corrupt institution is not a reason to abandon 
it.48 
Revolution 
Now we are in a position to discuss one of modernity’s most 
powerful ideas, whose development during the 20th Century was 
nevertheless very umpromising. Donoso Cortés called it “the 
most terrible word of all”: Revolution. 
Pérez characterizes his Marxism as “revolutionary” 
[I]n the specific sense that it claims that only violence can 
break the chain of violence, already installed by dominant 
classes. But also in the slightly more scholarly sense that 
the only way to finish the prevailing class domination is 
radically to change the rule of law and, eventually, putting 
class struggle to an end will imply abolishing any 
institutional kind of rule of law.49 
Later on Pérez will claim that the dichotomy “reform-
revolution” is “one of the most sterile and destructive 
discussions in the culture of the left,”50 because “the 
difference between reform and revolution is one of degree, of 
range, it is not a disjunctive and least of all an 
antagonism.”51 
 To some extent, the whole of this article’s argument 
is contained here. The usual oppositions that we have been 
discussing would understand that the difference between 
reform and revolution is a difference of type: the liberal 
and conservative would say, in fact, that only reform is 
acceptable (because revolution implies violence and it is, as 
                     
48 See McCabe, "Comment". 
49 Pérez, Proposición de un Marxismo Hegeliano, p. 67. 
50 ibid, 182. 
51 ibid, 183. 
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a method of political action, it is “immoral”), while the 
infantile communist will believe that only revolution is 
acceptable (because in order to end with alienation it is 
necessary to seize power and arrange everything anew). A 
sacramental understanding of politics may overcome this 
opposition because it understands that revolution is a 
radicalization of what is already present in our 
institutional forms of life; it is not about replacing one 
set of institutions for another, nor about doing away with 
them, but about radicalizing them. 
But it is precisely because this point contains the 
whole argument that the way in which Pérez discusses it is so 
insufficient. Indeed, Pérez is not overly interested in the 
emancipatory dimension of our institutional forms of life. 
This emancipatory dimension does not lie (it is always 
important to remind ourselves) in the fact that institutional 
forms of live actually enable us to live non-alienated lives, 
so that we could accept them naively. This is why thetheir 
emancipatory dimension is not denied when we recognize that 
institutions are corrupt, that they have an oppressive 
dimension. Every actually existing institution possesses 
these two faces, one oppressive and one emancipatory. When we 
discussed the institutional forms of our religious practices, 
we noted something that may be generalized: they belong to an 
alienated world. A non-alienated world is a world in which 
mutual radical recognition is no longer improbable, and 
therefore there would be no need to make it probable by means 
of institutions: it will have become second nature to us or, 
better yet, we will have then understood that non-alientated 
life had always been our authentic nature. The point, 
however, is not what we might say about forms of life we 
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cannot imagine, but how they inform our actions, even if we 
cannot actually imagine them. It is about identifying the 
forms of political action that are sacramental, not because 
they are instrumental to hasten the arrival of the Kingdom 
(or Communism), but because they anticipate it. As we have 
seen, the idea that alienation may be diagnosed from a non-
alienated perspective makes no sense at all. It can only be 
identified from within alienation, as an existential 
experience of deficit. And it is this existential experience 
of deficit that must be coupled with an understanding of our 
institutional forms of life that shuns both cynicism and 
naivety. Cynics only see the oppressive face of institutions; 
the naive only see their emancipatory side. The former ignore 
that institutions carry the promise of a non-alienated life 
(in contract we find the idea of exchanges among subjects 
that recognize each other completely, in marriage the idea of 
a community based on love, etc), while the latter ignore that 
actually existing institutions can never live up to their own 
promises, and that the extent of their failure to do so is 
the extent of their being instruments of oppression. 
I want to refer here to a rather unknown exchange of 
letters between Karl Marx and Pierre-Joseph Proudhon.52 In 
1846, Marx wrote to Proudhon inviting him to become a member 
of a European socialist and communist network to get German, 
French and English socialists in touch. The network was 
meant, on the one hand, to create a discussion forum that 
surpassed nationalist limitations and, on the other hand, to 
allow members in one country to be informed of developments 
elsewhere, to be prepared “when the moment of action comes.” 
                     
52 I have discussed this exchange in further detail in Atria, 
"Veinte años después, neoliberalismo con rostro humano". 
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Proudhon accepted the invitation without enthusiasm. Along 
with his acceptance, however, Proudhon included two 
remarkable substantive observations in response to Marx. The 
second observation is particularly relevant now: 
I have also some observations to make on this phrase of your 
letter: at the moment of action. Perhaps you still retain the 
opinion that no reform is at present possible without a coup 
de main, without what was formerly called a revolution and is 
really nothing but a shock. That opinion, which I understand, 
which I excuse, and would willingly discuss, having myself 
shared it for a long time, my most recent studies have made 
me abandon completely. I believe we have no need of it in 
order to succeed; and that consequently we should not put 
forward revolutionary action as a means of social reform, 
because that pretended means would simply be an appeal to 
force, to arbitrariness, in brief, a contradiction. I myself 
put the problem in this way: to bring about the return to 
society, by an economic combination, of the wealth which was 
withdrawn from society by another economic combination. In 
other words, through Political Economy to turn the theory of 
Property against Property in such a way as to engender what 
you German socialists call community and what I will limit 
myself for the moment to calling liberty or equality. But I 
believe that I know the means of solving this problem with 
only a short delay; I would therefore prefer to burn Property 
by a slow fire, rather than give it new strength by making a 
St Bartholomew’s night of the proprietors.53 
From our historical and spiritual moment it is hard not to 
see the sense behind Proudhon’s observations. Particularly in 
the third world, so much bloodshed, so many frustrated 
expectations of revolutions that in the end were “nothing but 
a shock”! When one remembers the seizures produced by the 
Land Reform (agrarian reform) in Chile, and the fact that 
less than ten years later the most extreme neoliberalism the 
world has ever known was instituted in storm of  fire and 
steel (and this is not a metaphor!), how can we fail to see 
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the truth behind Proudhon’s fear of giving property new 
strength by replaying St. Bartholomew’s night with landowners 
instead of Huguenots!54. 
I think that Pérez’s concept of revolution fails to take 
account of this. Perez’s suggested measures (reducing work 
time while keeping the wages fixed, decentralizing public 
services, reducing the cost of credit, etc.55) is a set of 
instrumental measures the value of which can be reduced to 
its instrumental aptitude to bring about more humanity, but 
precisely because of this aspect, not a humanity that is 
essentially free. It is not a program of political action 
that strives towards a radicalization of the unfulfilled 
promises of our own institutions. Pérez leaves no space to 
explain the meaning of our current political forms in terms 
of their two faces. This double face explains the “more 
scholarly” sense of revolution Pérez defends (though I am not 
sure he would recognize my reading). A revolution is in this 
sense a radical transformation of our forms of life, so 
radical, in fact, that pre-revolutionary discourse about 
post-revolutionary life cannot but avail itself of 
representations, that is to say, to analogies and metaphors. 
The reason for this is that post-revolutionary life cannot be 
explained in terms of a pre-revolutionary life: 
The revolutionary ... proposes to change not merely this or 
that detail within society, but the structure, and hence the 
values of the society itself. The revolutionary does not 
propose something that in terms of this society is better; he 
wants to change the terms. He wants history to advance not 
                     
54 I am not saying that the agrarian reform in Chile was such 
a St Bartholomew’s night of the proprietors. But it is clear 
that they understood it as such, and that explains why there 
was to be, after the 1973 coup d’etat, so much violence.  
55  
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simply further along the established lines, but along new 
lines. Now such lines extend into the past as well as into 
the future. I mean that each society interprets its history 
as leading up to itself, as well as leading forward into the 
future. Indeed each society is its interpretation of its 
past, just as each person is his interpretation of his past; 
I hope this does not sound too enigmatic. I only mean that if 
you ask yourself the question 'who am I?' you answer by 
producing  and autobiography. A radical change in society, a 
revolution, means a change in its interpretation of history, 
just as a radical change in a person a conversion let us say, 
involves a change in the whole of his autobiography. He now 
sees that he was a miserable sinner even though while he was 
committing the miserable sins he was really rather cheerful 
about it all.56 
Hence Pérez is right when he says that revolution implies 
“changing the rule of law radically” and “abolishing any 
institutional kind of rule of law”. Those institutional forms 
are the sign of a deficit, so they will not be necessary when 
the deficit is overcome. But it is a mistake to conclude from 
this that “revolution” implies fighting those institutional 
forms in order to abolish them. How will we know what we are 
fighting for, and how will we be able to distinguish 
revolution from a purely imaginary future, from an illusion? 
The question is the same as the one we already answered 
following Pérez: How can we know what it is like to live a 
non-alienated life? It is impossible, because post-
revolutionary forms of life cannot be described in pre-
revolutionary language. We can only know how it is not going 
to be, and it is crucial for that to assume the existential 
experience of deficit. Our institutional life (the “rule of 
law”), keeps that existential experience alive. But as we 
have seen, living with the existential experience of deficit 
is painful because it means living with cognitive dissonance, 
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although this painful experience can be reduced through 
denial (false consciousness): the denial of thinking that the 
rule of law as it actually exists fully guarantees freedom 
and autonomy (to do so requires redefining liberty and 
autonomy: negative liberty, for example), but also through 
the false consciousness of thinking that the institutions of 
the rule of law are only a mask of exploitation. Although 
institutions (the “rule of law”) are indeed signs of deficit, 
the deficit is not in the existence of the rule of law, but 
in the conditions of our lives that make the rule of law 
necessary in order to live human lives. By making this 
dramatic mistake, Pérez seems to be in line with the 20th 
century revolutionaries who fought for revolution but did not 
achieve revolution, but what Proudhon (the utopian 
socialist!) saw: an appeal to force, to arbitrariness; in the 
end, a contradiction. For today it is hard to deny that, as 
Tomás Moulian has said: 
Socialist revolutions could never overcome their mark of 
origin and always needed coercion to affirm themselves. They 
could never build a participatory democracy because the “all-
out war” (guerra a muerte) never ceases: it is endsless.57 
In other words, the objection against Pérez’s less scholarly 
idea of revolution is not a moralist objection that condemns 
violence as a method of political action. It is a political 
objection, one that holds that violence is not a force that 
can be dominated, but is rather a force that dominates anyone 
who thinks they have dominated it,58 and makes us forget what 
it was that we were fighting for. 
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58 See Weil, "The Iliad, or the poem of might", and Atria, 
"Reconciliation and reconstitution". 
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III. THE PEOPLE AND ITS WILL 
À force de se comporter comme un homme 
amoureux, il devint de nouveau un 
homme amoureux. 
Isabel Coixet, Bastille (2006) 
 
Now we can return to the question about the people, its will 
and the law. Our question was: how can the people will 
anything, and in particular, how can it will into being the 
rules of ascription? The argument up to now implies that our 
problem can be solved by understanding the question. In 
particular, by understanding its mode of signifying 
imperfectly. This will lead to the observation that, like any 
theology free from idolatry, our understanding of these 
political concepts will have to be negative,or, “apophatic”. 
The will of the people as a double metaphor: 
the metaphor of the will 
For a start, it may be useful to consider the usual objection 
to the liberal idea of self-ownership, of the property of 
one’s own person. This idea is the basis of liberalism (or at 
least some varieties of liberalism), because it grounds the 
natural rights that individuals want to protect by means of 
the social contract. The usual objection is that this idea 
rests in a Cartesian dualism of mind and body that is 
nowadays inacceptable: it assumes that behind this body there 
is “me”, its owner: that my body is an object possessed by a 
subject different from it as any owner possesses his things, 
a ghost in the machine. And this, of course, is absurd. 
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The charge of dualism is an objection against a positive 
understanding of self-ownership: if the thesis is understood 
as an answer to the question of who owns my body, it seems to 
be unavoidably dualist. But the thesis finds basis in a 
negative interpretation, according to which what is important 
about it is not the way it answers the question, but its 
self-evident negative implication: that nobody else (neither 
the lord, nor the king, etc.) owns me nor my body: I am not a 
slave, I am free. In this negative sense, the idea of self-
ownership is not only free of objection of Cartesian dualism, 
but it also possesses content that is undeniably 
emancipatory: it marks the movement, to use Maine’s 
celebrated expression, from status to contract.59 
Just as the self-ownership thesis is distorted if it is 
understood in a cataphatic rather than in an apophatic way, 
the thesis of law as the will of the people must be 
understood in an apophatic way: it is the will of no one 
else. Thus, the idea of the will of the people marks the 
transformation of subjects into citizens. 
But let us try to move further ahead. In order to do 
this, we must use representations. Why a will? The answer 
becomes apparent if we acknowledge a fundamental fact about 
what we might call the grammar of the will. Compare what is 
sometimes called the “direction of fit” of preferences and 
beliefs: while beliefs are directed to fit the world (thus 
                     
59 The question, of course, is not only “philosophical”. 
Gerald Cohen claimed (in Cohen, Self-ownership) that the 
self-ownership thesis that lies at the bottom of Marx’s 
concept of exploitation, makes it liable to a neoliberal 
critique like the one deployed by Robert Nozick. Therefore, 
Cohen claimed, the thesis had to be abandoned. But what had 
to be abandoned is the thesis in its cataphatic sense only.  
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having an intrinsic criterion of correctness) desires are 
directed to make the world fit to them (hence they are self-
affirming). If I am challenged (‘why do you want X?’) I can 
point to the fact that I want it (‘this is simply who I am’). 
If I am challenged as to why I believe something I owe an 
explanation in terms of reasons, i.e. in terms of the world. 
Whoever invokes a belief in the public, appeals, then 
(correctly or incorrectly), to what is universal, to reasons 
that are, in principle, valid for everyone.60 The 
particularity of the person speaking is, therefore, 
transparent. The speaker claims to be giving expression to 
something that is in principle universal, in the sense that 
it could be said by anyone; but he who expresses a will 
affirms his particularity - he claims (correctly or 
incorrectly) authority to decide the issue, to decide it in 
such a way that the decision is not made valid by its 
correctness, but rather because it is his decision. The 
particularity of the person who wants is not transparent: his 
wanting is contingent and thus it is valid because it is his 
will: 
What is sacred in science is truth; what is sacred in art is 
beauty. Truth and beauty are impersonal. All this is too 
obvious.  
 If a child is doing a sum and does it wrong, the mistake 
bears the stamp of his personality. If he does the sum 
exactly right, his personality does not enter into it at all.  
 Perfection is impersonal.61 
Because perfection is impersonal and truth universal, 
believing is transparent: the phrase “I believe that p (is 
the case)” means the same than “p (is the case)”. But willing 
                     
60 This subject is thoroughly discussed in Atria, "La verdad 
y lo político (i): La verdad y su dimensión constitutiva". 
61 Weil, "On Human Personality". 
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is not transparent in the same way: a will is always 
somebody’s will. To say that law is will is to say that the 
existence of law (its validity) is not something universal, 
that it is always somebody’s law: it has been posited, rather 
than discovered. Auctoritas, non veritas, facit legem. The 
sense in which this is an emancipatory idea can also be found 
in Hobbes’ Leviathan: 
And when men that think themselves wiser than all others, 
clamor and demand right Reason for judge; yet seek no more, 
but that things should be determined, by no other mens reason 
but their own, it is as intolerable in the society of men, as 
it is in play after trump is turned, to use for trump on 
every occasion, that suite whereof they have most in their 
hand. For they do nothing els, that will have every of their 
passions, as it comes to bear sway in them, to be taken for 
right Reason, and that in their own controversies: bewraying 
their want of right Reason, by the claym they lay to it.62 
The reason why law is volition is that its validity does not 
depend on its conformity to reason. And the reason for this 
is that, ever since Hobbes, appeal to the authority of reason 
does not immediately constitute an appeal to reason’s 
authority, but rather an appeal to the authority of the 
person making the appeal. 
In this first sense, the apophatic content of the idea 
that law is volition is denial of the unmediated authority of 
reason. It is a mistake to understand the denial as a 
celebration of irrationality. It only means that reason 
cannot rest in any formal authority, and thus its strength is 
reducible, to use Habermasian jargon, to the unforced force 
of the better argument. And this is related to the second 
sense in which law is will. To affirm that I want X is the 
same as saying that (I think that) X suits my own interest. 
                     
62 Hobbes, Leviathan, Ch 5. 
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Of course, I may be wrong. But if no one has authority over 
me, that means that only I can correct myself to reach 
greater clarity as regards my interests. My destiny is my 
responsibility, and my mistakes will be mistakes and will 
last until I correct them, (this was the first sense: my will 
is valid because it is mine). Thus, my decisions may be 
described as mine, and my history is my biography. 
In this second sense, the fact that law is the people’s 
will means that law is what goes in the people’s interest, 
that is to say, in everyone’s interest (we will say more 
about this step from “the people” to “everyone” soon). But of 
course this is too ambitious; as Rousseau said in The Social 
Contract, 
In order to discover the rules of association that are most 
suitable to nations, a superior intelligence would be 
necessary who could see all the passions of men without 
experiencing any of them; who would have no affinity with our 
nature and yet know it thoroughly; whose happiness would not 
depend on us, and who would nevertheless be quite willing to 
interest himself in ours; and, lastly, one who, storing up 
for himself with the progress of time a far-off glory in the 
future, could labor in one age and enjoy in another. 
 Gods would be necessary to give laws to men.63 
By discovering the idea of “general will”, Rousseau founded 
the modern democratic tradition. But the moment in which he 
discovered the idea and the moment in which he identified its 
historical or political improbability were the same. Using 
the terms introduced above, although applying them to 
Rousseau is anachronistic, we may say that the improbability 
of the general will lies in the fact that it must be 
identified under conditions of alienation. In these 
conditions, what is ours appears alien. Thus, the general 
                     
63 Rousseau, The Social Contract, 2.7. 
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will, i.e. what goes in everybody’s interest, seems to be 
different and opposed to our own, factious, particular 
interest. This contradiction between common and particular 
interest, is what gives meaning to the idea of ‘state of 
nature’ (the case proposed by Hobbes is, as always, the most 
perspicuous one): the state of nature was a literary resource 
to illustrate circumstances in which it was immediately 
evident to the reader that the individuals’ immediate 
interests were in conflict with their real interests. The 
paradox of the natural condition of mankind is not that there 
is bellum omnium contra omnes, a situation that is deplorable 
for all, but the fact that such a situation is brought about 
by the rational actions of individual people, each of whom is 
doing what, in the circumstances, goes in his or her 
individual interest. Because everyone is pursuing his or her 
individual interest, everyone loses. And note carefully that 
here “everyone” does not mean a magical, mysterious 
supraindividual entity, but each one. 
The problem is not that there is no such thing as the 
interest of all; the problem is that in the natural condition 
of mankind identifying the common interest is unlikely, and 
what is likely is that each will pursue his or her individual 
immediate interest. This is the reason why “without a common 
power to keep them all in awe, [men] are in that condition 
which is called Warre”, in which “nothing can be Unjust.”64 
Thus, the creation of a common power capable of keeping 
all in awe is what makes peace likely.65 But though it makes 
                     
64 Hobbes, Leviathan, Ch 13, p. 88-89. 
65 That is why it is so naïve to say that the function of the 
constitution is to “limit” power. Not because it is naïve to 
believe that power needs to be limited (that is obviously 
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peace likely it does not make freedom likely, for it makes us 
subject to an heteronomous will. The sense of democratic 
institutions is that they make it more likely that we shall 
only be subjected to what is in the interest of all. This 
they do by introducing formal criteria of recognition (just 
as we have seen that the law of contracts introduces formal 
criteria of recognition of fair exchanges, or the law of 
wills introduces formal criteria of recognition of the 
deceased’s last will as to how his or her assets ought to be 
distributed). When those criteria are met, because those 
criteria are met, then we can treat the relevant decision as 
a decision taken from the point of view of everybody. We can 
express this by saying that the decision has been taken in 
the name of everybody, i.e. that it is everybody’s decision. 
But notice that the claim that it is everybody’s decision is 
not based on the idea that the formal criteria are likely to 
produce a right aggregation of preferences. Indeed, in times 
in which the number of citizens who fail to vote is 
considerable, there is no reason to assume that, if 
aggregating preferences were the fundamental point about 
                                                               
true), but because of the assumption that this is the first 
problem, the main function of a constitution. But the 
limitation of power is the second problem. The first problem, 
the really fundamental one, is the creation of power. 
Constitutions create power, and so enable us to overcome the 
state of war among us, which is the sign of the absence of 
power (Hobbes’ “natural equality”). The case of Iraq’s 
postwar situation is the most evident case of the dissolution 
of power and of the difficulty (or even, in these 
circumstances, the impossibility) of re-creating it (on this, 
see Gray, Black Mass, pp. 149-161), but there is no need for 
us to go this far: the problem in Latin America is precisely 
that: the creation of a power strong enough to submit the 
natural forces (that are sometimes called, using a 
contradictory expression “factual powers”). 
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democratic institutions, a sufficiently sophisticated poll 
would not produce a better report than a popular election. 
The point is not about aggregating preferences, but of 
assuming the proper perspective. And law’s claim to be 
everybody’s decision is based on the fact that, by advancing 
through the different stages of institutional procedure and 
thus causing the issue to be discussed in public by different 
people from different perspectives, when a decision receives 
the final, formal mark that allows us formally to identify it 
as the will of the people it is likely that it will have been 
purged of particular interests. O at least more likely than 
alternative institutional arrangements such as four generals 
deciding what is good for an entire country.66  
For, let us not forget, the general argument about 
institutions involved two moments. The first was answering 
the question of the meaning of the institution: it was held 
to be a means to make something probable that would otherwise 
be improbable. The second regarded the way in which 
institutions can achieve: a testament is an institutional 
device to identify the last will of the deceased as to how 
his or her assets ought to be distributed, but when asking 
whether a testament is valid we do not ask the substantive 
question: Does it truly contain the testator’s last view on 
                     
66 In a Chilean summer festival in February 2011, a stand-up 
comedian made a rather homophobic routine. The next artist 
was Puerto Rican band Calle 13, and its leader, Resident, 
criticized it on national television. The next day the 
comedian said that he would not accept any criticism coming 
from a foreigner. Resident replied with a phrase that 
explains better than I could the reason why institutionally 
mediated democracy cannot be understood as a second best vis-
a-vis direct democracy: “I see from afar what you can’t see 
from up close” (“veo de lejos lo que no ves de cerca”). 
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the subject? A contract is an institution of which the 
function is identifying exchanges that are fair, i.e., those 
in which none of the parties has been exploited by the other 
as if they were simply resources, yet in order to determine 
whether a particular instance of the institution is valid we 
do not ask the substantive question: is it fair? The 
legislator is an institution of which the point is the 
identification of that which is in everybody’s interest, but 
when a given law has been passed its validity cannot be 
challenged by showing that it is not in everybody’s interest, 
that instead in this case a particular lobby was especially 
effective. 
Thus, we treat whatever is produced by the institution 
(laws in the “formal” sense) as if it were what really lies 
in everybody’s interests (laws in the “material” or 
“substantive” sense). The gap between the formal and the 
substantive sense can only be properly breached by (something 
like) the notion of a sacrament, as explained above. 
Law, then, is a sacrament of radical recognition. This 
implies that it has two faces, which correspond to the two 
senses in which law equates to will. To citizens, it presents 
itself as their will, as what we think is good for us. As it 
happens with all of our beliefs, it is fully reducible to our 
reasons for believing it is correct.67 This is shown by the 
fact that it does not make sense to hold fast to a belief 
that one has come to accept is false. Our beliefs, in other 
words, are intrinsically connected to reason, they are 
transparent to reason (not in the sense, obviously false, 
that I can only have “true” beliefs if they are rational, but 
                     
67 The point is thoroughly discussed in Atria, "La verdad y 
lo político (i): La verdad y su dimensión constitutiva". 
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in the sense that I cannot hold a belief once I have seen it 
as irrational). That is why political deliberation knows no a 
priori limits: the fact that a will has been formed by means 
of legislative procedure does not constitute a reason to stop 
thinking or deliberating or campaigning about the issue, so 
that if we come to the conclusion that the previous decision 
was wrong we can simply change it. This is the meaning of the 
old idea that law does not bind the legislator. 
But if law appears to the citizen as his or her will, as 
what they believe from a universal point of view, namely, 
what they really want, it appears to the individual as pure 
heteronomy: as a decision that is valid because it has been 
adopted in accordance with valid procedures, and that will 
stay in force, even if he or she does not agree with it, 
until it is repealed in accordance with the same procedures. 
To a pharmaceutical company’s CEO who negotiates collusive 
agreements according tothe law of his competitors, it does 
not appear to him ashis own will, but rather as a norm that 
binds her regardless of her desire; that is, that coercively 
constrains her freedom. 
This is the reason why law is, like religion, the sign 
of an alienated world. Hence, Pérez claims that under 
Communism there will be “exchange but no market …, family but 
no marriage, government but no state, organizations but no 
institutions”68 and then he adds: “order but no laws.”69 Each 
of these pairs is meant to rescue law’s first dimension while 
denying the second. All of them express the idea that 
institutions make probable what is improbable: were it not 
for our alienation, family, government, organizations, and 
                     
68 Pérez, Proposición de un Marxismo Hegeliano, p. 20. 
69 ibid, 91. 
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order would be immediately probable (i.e., probable without 
institutional mediation), because they would seem “natural” 
and thus institutions would become redundant. But the 
question before us now concerns the sense in which living 
with markets, states, marriage, institutions and laws points 
to a non-alienated life in which exchange, family, 
government, organizations and order come about naturally. It 
is in this tension that the idea of the law as the will of 
the people exists. 
For there were gods before Christianity, and peoples 
(pueblos) before democracy. And just as Christian theology 
uses a pagan concept, god, in order to subvert it and express 
the idea that there are no gods, democratic tradition takes 
hold of an anti-democratic concept, ‘the people’, in order to 
subvert it and express the idea that there are no peoples 
(pueblos).70 The mistake of thinking that God is a 
supernatural wizard is equivalent to mistaking the people for 
a discrete group of individuals each distinguishable from the 
next, which is the mistake of using, as has become common in 
our days, the word “people” (pueblo) in the plural (like 
“indigenous peoples”). Pueblo, like God, is a word that can 
only be used in the singular.  
The people, bearer of a negativity 
Idolatry (theological or political) starts, as we have seen, 
in the movement from the negative to the positive, from the 
apophatic to the cataphatic. Positively characterized, God is 
                     
70 The standard Spanish rendering of “people” is “pueblo”. 
But “pueblo” is a singular noun, hence grammatically speaking 
it admits a plural form (“pueblos”). Since this is not the 
case in English, in this paragraph I had to use the Spanish 
word. 
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a super wizard, and the people is an existing entity, defined 
by race or some equivalent (natural) property. An apophatic 
idea of God understands it as the denial of all human 
deficits, and so we could say: God is love. This is not a 
statement about what God is, but one about that which denies 
all human deficits (thus the argument discussed here is not a 
reformulation of Feuerbach’s familiar argument, but rather 
its reversal: it is the reversal of the reversal). 
Correspondingly, “people” is a denial of all political 
deficits, and so we are able to say that it is radical mutual 
recognition. Again, this is not so much a statement about 
what ‘the people’ is as statement about that denies all 
political deficits. The contrary is political or religious 
idolatry.  
Schmitt says that “in a special sense”, the people is a 
negative concept: 
In a special meaning of the word, the people are everyone who 
is not honoured and distinguished, everyone not privileged, 
everyone prominent not because of property, social position 
or education. Thus states Schopenhauer: ‘whoever does not 
understand Latin is part of the people’. In the French 
revolution of the year 1789, the bourgeoisie as Third State 
could identify itself with the nation and the bourgeoisie was 
the people, because the bourgeoisie was the opposition to the 
aristocracy and to the privileged. Sieyès posed the famous 
question: What is the Third State? He answered that it is the 
nation. The third state is nothing and should become 
everything. But as soon as the bourgeoisie itself appeared as 
the class that is marked by property and that dominates the 
state, the negation had to move. Now the proletariat became 
the people, because it becomes the bearer of this negativity: 
it is the part of the population that does not have property, 
does not participate in the productive surplus, and finds no 
place in the existing order.71 
                     
71Schmitt, Constitutional Theory, p. 272. 
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And, in order to avoid the predictable ad-hominem objection 
of the Nazi-hunter, who will find a way to show that somehow 
Nazism follows from this, we may note that the same idea, 
albeit in somewhat different terms, is defended by Pérez: 
Our enemies have and must have the same universal rights we 
claim for ourselves. What we deny them are those particular 
rights which they claim for themselves, and which make them, 
structurally, our enemies: all those rights that have only 
been established to legitimate exploitation.72 
This is why ‘the people’ is universal: because it is the 
bearer of a negativity. Any non-negative feature with which 
we were to characterize it would be a non-universal property. 
From here the argument proceeds along the lines we have 
discussed: politics (rather than a modus vivendi on the one 
hand and management on the other) can only survive under a 
sacramental conception of our institutional life, and the 
Protestant principle is the negation of one of the main 
reasons why such sacramental understanding is unlikely: 
because of the normalizing effect of institutions, i.e., its 
operative opacity. Political institutions will always be 
defective, because of the very same reasons we need them. 
Like the Kingdom of God, which in Cullmann’s celebrated 
formula is with us “already but not yet,”73 law is the will 
of the people, but it will never be the will of the people, 
until we can in fact have order but not law, in which case it 
will be made redundant; when, in other words, it will wither 
away.  
Does this idea lead to a devaluation of our democratic 
institutions? At this point, the answer to this question 
needs only to be verbalized: since alienation cannot be 
                     
72 Pérez, Proposición de un Marxismo Hegeliano, p. 186. 
73 Cullmann, Christ and Time, p. __. 
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“diagnosed” from a non-alienated situation, it can only be 
experienced as a contradiction between promise and 
deliverance: between the idea of fair exchange between 
subjects that recognize themselves reciprocally which gives 
meaning to the law of contracts and the strategic action it 
permits and, in a way, promotes; between the idea of 
gratuitous love which gives meaning to marriage and the 
spheres of abuse and domination it creates; between the 
aspiration to radical and reciprocal recognition that lies in 
the idea that sovereignty rests essentially with the people 
and the imperfect institutional forms that allow factious 
interests to mascarade themselves as common interests. By 
means of exploiting these contradictions we may understand 
what it means to overcome them. In Proudhon’s terms, we have 
to put the theory of property against property; the 
philosophy of contract as an autonomous exchange among agents 
that recognize each other against the contract by means of 
which each individual uses the other as an instruments to his 
or her own ends; the idea of the family as a community 
constituted by love against marriage as a sphere of 
patriarchal domination; the idea of law as the will of the 
people against the negotiations of the ‘political class’. 
This implies the exclusion of what may be called the 
“Portalian principle”. As is well known, Diego Portales was 
of the idea that citizens were “full of vice, … lacking all 
virtues necessary for democratic governance”. The corruption 
of the citizenry implied the necessity of “a strong, 
centralizing government”, so that only “once they have been 
moralized, the completely liberal government may come, free 
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and full of ideals, where all citizens have a place.”74 The 
objection to the Portalian principle need not be the denial 
of its premise, i.e. that we are, in an important sense, full 
of vices and lacking all virtues. The objection is that 
living under institutions whose contradictions make the fact 
of their deficit clear is the only way in which we can aspire 
to overcome alienation. Only living under imperfectly 
democratic institutions shall we develop the virtues 
necessary for democratic governance. 
The people as a post-institutional concept 
And now, at last, we can join the strands of the argument 
together. Our starting point was to note that the 
intelligibility of our political institutions depended, as 
the intelligibility of every legal concept, on its relation 
with some pre-institutional concept, namely, a concept which 
does not assume the existence of any institutional 
correlative. But though they require a non-institutional 
correlative to become intelligible, in their operation they 
must be opaque to it. A legal concept may operate without a 
pre-institutional correlative, but it is, in fact, 
unintelligible: pure formalism, a meaningless ritual. One 
that in its operation is fully transparent to its pre-
institutional correlative might be intelligible, but does not 
make any difference and is redundant.  
However, unlike other legal concepts, the democratic 
concept of ‘the people’ could not be pre-institutionally 
understood, because that would forced upon it a distorted 
                     
74 Written in Lima, March, 1822, and available in multiple 
sources. See, for example, Silva, "Ideas y confesiones de 
Portales", p. 15. 
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content: the people as a naturally characterized group (in 
which case democratic theory would be inherently racist, or 
ethnocentric) or as an aggregation of individual interests 
(in which case it would be inherently neoliberal). But with 
no pre-institutional correlative to render it intelligible, 
democratic institutions can be nothing but form. Thus the 
options do not seem particularly attractive: democratic 
institutions are an empty formalism, an arrangement 
neoliberal or plainly racist (ethnocentric). This is why 
nowadays we seem to be living under the domain of dead ideas, 
that is to say, ideas that operate, but are unintelligible. 
Given that we seem forced to choose one of the three options 
above to make sense of democratic institutions, no wonder 
that they look like dead ideas! 
But unlike all other legal concepts, and given its 
character as the founding concept of every other 
institutional form, the non-institutional correlate of the 
institutional concept of the people is not pre-institutional, 
but actually post-institutional: ‘the people’ is an 
anticipatory way of talking about the whole of humanity. We 
already live according to the will of the people, but not 
yet. Since it is an anticipatory concept, it rejects two 
opposite mistakes which should by now be familiar enough: the 
mistake of believing that, since in biological terms it 
constitutes a species, “humanity” is an operative political 
category and that of believing that politics can only be 
particularistic (be that either a ground to reject them or to 
embrace them) 
The people is the bearer of a negativity; it is the 
universal, bereft of everything particular. It is common 
humanity, universal community. However common, humanity does 
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not truly exist, but is rather a goal of history. But from 
this it does not follow that it is an empty concept. It 
exists in an anticipatory or eschatological manner, within 
our political practices, which can only be understood as 
grounded on its will.  
Thus, when we speak of the people, although we know how 
to use our words, there is an important sense in which we do 
not know what they mean. Fundamentally this is because of our 
special ignorance of universal reciprocal recognition. We 
know how to talk about infractions and contracts because of 
our understanding of infractions and contracts. We know how 
to talk about the people, not because of any understanding of 
the people, but because of what we know about its will.
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